media-cdn
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI tool in
scripts/cdn.tsreads sensitive API credentials directly from the user's home directory at~/.agents/.env.local. Accessing specific configuration files in hidden home directory paths is a sensitive file operation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The success criteria in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to verify uploads by executing acurlcommand targeting a URL returned by the CDN service. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the remote service returns a malicious payload formatted to escape the shell command context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data, including filenames and folder metadata, from an external CDN service without implementing boundary markers or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from the CDN API via the
list,get, anduploadcommands inscripts/cdn.ts(e.g., asset filenames and folder paths). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in asset metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system access (read/write) and network capabilities via
fetchandcurl. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of metadata sanitization or validation before the content is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata