media-cdn

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI tool in scripts/cdn.ts reads sensitive API credentials directly from the user's home directory at ~/.agents/.env.local. Accessing specific configuration files in hidden home directory paths is a sensitive file operation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The success criteria in SKILL.md instructs the agent to verify uploads by executing a curl command targeting a URL returned by the CDN service. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the remote service returns a malicious payload formatted to escape the shell command context.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data, including filenames and folder metadata, from an external CDN service without implementing boundary markers or sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved from the CDN API via the list, get, and upload commands in scripts/cdn.ts (e.g., asset filenames and folder paths).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in asset metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system access (read/write) and network capabilities via fetch and curl.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of metadata sanitization or validation before the content is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 11, 2026, 11:59 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — media-cdn