broker-integration
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes a plugin architecture that uses
importlib.import_module(f"broker.{broker}.api.<module>")andgetattr(module, "authenticate_broker")to load and execute code based on the configured broker name. This dynamic loading from computed paths is a standard pattern for the skill's plugin-based architecture but requires that the broker variable be strictly validated against a known-safe list. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external data from various broker APIs, including master contracts (CSV/JSON), order books, and market-data streams. This untrusted data is brought into the agent's context. The analysis found that while schema validation is mentioned for the API layer, there is a lack of explicit instructions for boundary markers or sanitization when this data is presented to the agent, creating a surface where a compromised broker API could influence agent behavior.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive authentication material, including
BROKER_API_KEY,BROKER_API_SECRET, and encrypted session tokens. While it follows best practices by using environment variables and Fernet encryption for database storage, the skill handles these credentials alongside network capabilities via a sharedhttpxclient, necessitating careful management to prevent accidental exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation contains several instructions involving shell command execution for development and auditing, such as
pip download,unzip, and the use of the!fd-auditskill syntax. These commands are intended for environment setup and verification but demonstrate the agent's capability to interact directly with the host system's shell.
Audit Metadata