broker-integration

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes a plugin architecture that uses importlib.import_module(f"broker.{broker}.api.<module>") and getattr(module, "authenticate_broker") to load and execute code based on the configured broker name. This dynamic loading from computed paths is a standard pattern for the skill's plugin-based architecture but requires that the broker variable be strictly validated against a known-safe list.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external data from various broker APIs, including master contracts (CSV/JSON), order books, and market-data streams. This untrusted data is brought into the agent's context. The analysis found that while schema validation is mentioned for the API layer, there is a lack of explicit instructions for boundary markers or sanitization when this data is presented to the agent, creating a surface where a compromised broker API could influence agent behavior.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive authentication material, including BROKER_API_KEY, BROKER_API_SECRET, and encrypted session tokens. While it follows best practices by using environment variables and Fernet encryption for database storage, the skill handles these credentials alongside network capabilities via a shared httpx client, necessitating careful management to prevent accidental exposure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation contains several instructions involving shell command execution for development and auditing, such as pip download, unzip, and the use of the !fd-audit skill syntax. These commands are intended for environment setup and verification but demonstrate the agent's capability to interact directly with the host system's shell.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 09:59 AM