skills/markus41/codex/skill-installer/Gen Agent Trust Hub

skill-installer

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to download and install executable code (AI skills) from arbitrary external GitHub repositories into the $CODEX_HOME/skills directory. This behavior allows for the introduction of untrusted code into the agent's environment, which is then executed by the host application upon restart.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches curated skill definitions from OpenAI's official GitHub repository. However, the skill also supports downloading scripts and data from any user-provided GitHub repository, which could host malicious payloads.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes Python scripts (scripts/list-curated-skills.py and scripts/install-skill-from-github.py) to manage installations. These scripts perform network requests and write to the local file system, and the instructions explicitly note the need for permission escalation when running in restricted environments.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external repositories.
  • Ingestion points: External GitHub repositories (referenced in SKILL.md and scripts).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands within the downloaded content.
  • Capability inventory: Uses Python scripts with network access and file system write permissions to install content into an executable path.
  • Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of validation or sanitization for the content being pulled from external sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 21, 2026, 10:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-installer