autoresearch-prompt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted data into its prompt templates.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context from the
eval_set.jsonlfile (which contains external newsletter content) and from standard input (stdin) when theclassifycommand is invoked. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ boundary markers, XML delimiters, or specific instructions to isolate interpolated fields from the prompt instructions. Values are directly substituted for
{{key}}placeholders inprompt.md. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network requests to the Anthropic API and processes JSON responses returned by the model.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization in
src/autoresearch_prompt/prompt_loader.pybefore the data is rendered into the final system and user messages.
Audit Metadata