review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources including GitHub Pull Request bodies/files via
gh pr viewand local code changes viagit diffas described inSKILL.md. There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content. Combined with theBashtool capability, a malicious PR could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-supplied input directly into shell commands (
gh pr view $ARGUMENTS) inSKILL.md. This presents a surface for command injection if the environment does not provide automatic argument sanitization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION_EVIDENCE]:
- Ingestion points:
gh pr viewoutput andgit diffoutput (referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory:
Bash,Read,Glob,Grep(allowed-tools inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent.
Audit Metadata