atelier-orchestrator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs aggressive, non-negotiable instructional language intended to override the agent's standard reasoning and autonomy.
  • Evidence: The file contains explicit override markers such as '', 'YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE', 'YOU MUST USE IT', 'This is not negotiable', and 'You cannot rationalize your way out of this'.
  • Context: These patterns are used to force the agent to invoke skills even when it might otherwise deem them unnecessary, effectively attempting to bypass the model's internal task-relevance filtering.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an orchestration workflow that ingests and processes untrusted user input to determine the agent's high-level operation mode.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided instructions (e.g., 'Add X' or 'Fix Y') are processed in SKILL.md to route the agent between 'Inline' and 'Spec-backed' plans.
  • Boundary markers: While the skill defines distinct planning modes, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the user-supplied task descriptions.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator manages high-privilege activities including file system modifications, architectural changes, and delegation to subagents (via 'spec-implement' and 'code-subagents').
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization of user instructions before they are used to influence the workflow state.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 18, 2026, 08:23 AM