code-subagents

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources during the subagent dispatch and review process.\n
  • Ingestion points: Task descriptions from plan.json, architectural decisions from spec.md, and implementation reports generated by subagents (referenced in SKILL.md and templates).\n
  • Boundary markers: The templates in references/ use markdown headers and placeholders (e.g., ## Task Description, {FULL TEXT ...}) to delimit external content, which provides some structural separation but does not prevent malicious instructions within that content from influencing the agent.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill facilitates file reading/writing (via the implementation tasks) and utilizes task management tools (e.g., the bd command mentioned in SKILL.md for closing tasks).\n
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external text before it is interpolated into the reviewer and implementer prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 12, 2026, 08:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — code-subagents