consult-codex
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute the
codexCLI tool using a Bash shell to perform analysis and get coding advice. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions explicitly guide the agent on how to grant the external service write access to the workspace using the
-s workspace-writeflag, which allows an external entity to modify local files. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: To function, the skill sends repository context, file contents, and specific prompts to an external service (OpenAI's Codex via the CLI).
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill recommends writing the output of the external service to
/tmp/codex-consult.txt, potentially exposing sensitive technical analysis in a shared temporary directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to be 'self-triggering,' meaning the agent is encouraged to decide on its own when to invoke this external process, which could be used to bypass user oversight for specific tasks or decision-making processes.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The mechanism for passing the agent's prompt to the shell command (
"<your prompt>") could be susceptible to command injection if the agent includes un-sanitized content or special shell characters in its query.
Audit Metadata