shell
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to take raw text from a user and execute it directly as a literal shell command using a terminal tool. This provides a direct interface for arbitrary command execution on the host environment.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Several instructions explicitly remove safety barriers:
- The configuration
disable-model-invocation: trueprevents the AI model from evaluating the safety or intent of the command before it is passed to the shell. - Instruction 3 ("Do not rewrite, explain, or 'improve' the command") and Instruction 2 ("Execute that command immediately") ensure that no sanitization or human-in-the-loop checks occur, allowing malicious payloads to run as-is.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant surface for indirect injection. If the agent reads untrusted content (e.g., a file, web page, or git commit) containing the trigger
/shell, it would execute any appended malicious commands immediately due to the lack of boundary markers or verification steps. - Ingestion points: Any user-provided text following the
/shelltrigger inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill consumes all text following the trigger as a command.
- Capability inventory: Full terminal tool access as implied by the "literal shell command" requirement.
- Sanitization: Explicitly forbidden by the instruction to not "rewrite, explain, or 'improve'" the input.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata