shell

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to take raw text from a user and execute it directly as a literal shell command using a terminal tool. This provides a direct interface for arbitrary command execution on the host environment.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Several instructions explicitly remove safety barriers:
  • The configuration disable-model-invocation: true prevents the AI model from evaluating the safety or intent of the command before it is passed to the shell.
  • Instruction 3 ("Do not rewrite, explain, or 'improve' the command") and Instruction 2 ("Execute that command immediately") ensure that no sanitization or human-in-the-loop checks occur, allowing malicious payloads to run as-is.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant surface for indirect injection. If the agent reads untrusted content (e.g., a file, web page, or git commit) containing the trigger /shell, it would execute any appended malicious commands immediately due to the lack of boundary markers or verification steps.
  • Ingestion points: Any user-provided text following the /shell trigger in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None present; the skill consumes all text following the trigger as a command.
  • Capability inventory: Full terminal tool access as implied by the "literal shell command" requirement.
  • Sanitization: Explicitly forbidden by the instruction to not "rewrite, explain, or 'improve'" the input.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 06:13 AM