Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime monkeypatch of thepypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod. This is used to resolve a specific data type handling bug inpypdfversion 5.7.0 when processing selection list fields. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process content from external PDF files using various methods (direct text extraction, OCR, and table parsing). This represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, where content within a PDF could attempt to influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: PDF files processed via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpytesseract(documented informs.mdandSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Not explicitly implemented in the provided extraction scripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read/write local files and manipulate document structure, but does not have native network capabilities.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is performed on the extracted text before it is presented to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation and guide reference multiple system utilities (e.g.,
qpdf,poppler-utils,pdftk) for advanced PDF operations.
Audit Metadata