handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill manages a
.docs/handoff.mdfile designed to provide context for subsequent agent sessions. This file includes a "Resume checklist" that explicitly directs the agent to "Re-run the last recorded validation command". Since these commands are extracted from potentially untrusted local markers (.docs/handoff.last-validation) or parsed from the existing handoff file and written back without sanitization, a malicious actor could inject shell commands into the project structure that a future agent might automatically execute. - Ingestion points:
scripts/handoff.pyreads untrusted data from project-local files including.docs/handoff.last-validation,.docs/handoff.session, and the previous content of.docs/handoff.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses standard Markdown headings but lacks specific delimiters or system-level instructions to the agent to treat the captured validation commands as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The utility script
scripts/handoff.pyusessubprocess.runfor Git operations. The AI agent itself has broad tool-execution capabilities and is prompted by the skill's output to perform further shell executions. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or verification of the extracted command strings is performed before they are persisted in the markdown output.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/handoff.pyutilizessubprocess.runto interact with the localgitbinary. While the specific arguments passed togitwithin the script are hardcoded and do not utilizeshell=True, the skill's operational model is built around capturing and suggesting the execution of arbitrary shell commands (e.g., test runners and linters) from the project environment.
Audit Metadata