skills/mathews-tom/armory/handoff/Gen Agent Trust Hub

handoff

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill manages a .docs/handoff.md file designed to provide context for subsequent agent sessions. This file includes a "Resume checklist" that explicitly directs the agent to "Re-run the last recorded validation command". Since these commands are extracted from potentially untrusted local markers (.docs/handoff.last-validation) or parsed from the existing handoff file and written back without sanitization, a malicious actor could inject shell commands into the project structure that a future agent might automatically execute.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/handoff.py reads untrusted data from project-local files including .docs/handoff.last-validation, .docs/handoff.session, and the previous content of .docs/handoff.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses standard Markdown headings but lacks specific delimiters or system-level instructions to the agent to treat the captured validation commands as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The utility script scripts/handoff.py uses subprocess.run for Git operations. The AI agent itself has broad tool-execution capabilities and is prompted by the skill's output to perform further shell executions.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or verification of the extracted command strings is performed before they are persisted in the markdown output.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/handoff.py utilizes subprocess.run to interact with the local git binary. While the specific arguments passed to git within the script are hardcoded and do not utilize shell=True, the skill's operational model is built around capturing and suggesting the execution of arbitrary shell commands (e.g., test runners and linters) from the project environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 09:09 AM