literature-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external academic sources such as arXiv, Semantic Scholar, and Google Scholar.
  • Ingestion points: The workflow includes searching for and extracting data from abstracts and full-text PDFs in Phase 2 and Phase 4 (SKILL.md).
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute local scripts via uv run and perform network operations to retrieve academic content (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit boundary markers or provide warnings to the agent to disregard instructions that may be embedded within the external research papers.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the text extracted from PDFs or abstracts is specified before it is analyzed by the language model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a command-line utility to perform searches, which involves passing user-generated queries as arguments to a Python script.
  • Evidence: uv run --with arxiv python scripts/arxiv_search.py "QUERY" in SKILL.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the uv tool to manage dependencies, which may result in the dynamic download and installation of the arxiv Python package at runtime.
  • Evidence: The workflow in Phase 2 of SKILL.md specifies the use of uv run --with arxiv.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill initiates network requests to external, well-known academic services to fetch paper metadata, citations, and search results.
  • Evidence: References to api.semanticscholar.org, scholar.google.com, and connectedpapers.com throughout SKILL.md and references/search-strategy.md.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 09:09 AM