literature-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external academic sources such as arXiv, Semantic Scholar, and Google Scholar.
- Ingestion points: The workflow includes searching for and extracting data from abstracts and full-text PDFs in Phase 2 and Phase 4 (
SKILL.md). - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute local scripts via
uv runand perform network operations to retrieve academic content (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit boundary markers or provide warnings to the agent to disregard instructions that may be embedded within the external research papers.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the text extracted from PDFs or abstracts is specified before it is analyzed by the language model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a command-line utility to perform searches, which involves passing user-generated queries as arguments to a Python script.
- Evidence:
uv run --with arxiv python scripts/arxiv_search.py "QUERY"inSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the
uvtool to manage dependencies, which may result in the dynamic download and installation of thearxivPython package at runtime. - Evidence: The workflow in Phase 2 of
SKILL.mdspecifies the use ofuv run --with arxiv. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill initiates network requests to external, well-known academic services to fetch paper metadata, citations, and search results.
- Evidence: References to
api.semanticscholar.org,scholar.google.com, andconnectedpapers.comthroughoutSKILL.mdandreferences/search-strategy.md.
Audit Metadata