pr-swarm
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
nohup bash -canddisownto launch background processes, specifically theclaudeCLI, to handle parallel pull request workflows. TheclaudeCLI is invoked with the--permission-mode bypassPermissionsflag, granting the background agent full autonomy to execute tools, including shell commands and file modifications, without user approval.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an Indirect Prompt Injection surface by instructing agents to read and react to pull request descriptions, review comments, and body text from GitHub.\n - Ingestion points: Pull request metadata and review comments retrieved from GitHub (Phase 1, Phase 6, and references/verification-gates.md).\n
- Boundary markers: The lane prompt template provides isolation instructions but lacks explicit directives to ignore or treat embedded instructions in PR data as untrusted.\n
- Capability inventory: The background agents have unrestricted access to local system tools and the GitHub CLI via the
bypassPermissionsflag.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the external content before the agent processes it.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The combination of automated background execution with full tool permissions and the ingestion of untrusted external content allows for potential remote code execution triggered by third-party GitHub users.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill executes standard package management commands (npm, yarn, bun) and build scripts within isolated worktrees, which involves fetching third-party code from well-known registries. These are standard operations for development workflows.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata