skill-library
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches a package catalog and individual skill files from the author's GitHub repository at
github.com/Mathews-Tom/armory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Orchestrates various shell commands including
curl,git,rsync,rm,awk, andgrepto manage local files and perform network operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several procedures in the
cookbook/directory (notablyremove.md,use.md, andsync.md) interpolate user-provided package names directly into shell commands. For example,rm -rf ~/.claude/skills/<name>/andmkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/<name>are used without explicit sanitization of the<name>variable, which could lead to command injection or unauthorized file deletion if the input is maliciously crafted. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes an external
manifest.yamlfile to determine package metadata and installation paths. Malicious content in this remote manifest could influence the agent's display or lead it to perform unintended actions. - Ingestion points: Remote
manifest.yamlfetched from GitHub (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None used to delimit or ignore instructions within the manifest content.
- Capability inventory: File system read/write, directory removal (
rm -rf), network downloads, and file permission modification. - Sanitization: Uses standard text processing tools like
awkandgrepfor metadata extraction, but lacks robust validation of remote data fields. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documentation specifies that
utilitytype packages are installed usingchmod +x, allowing for the execution of downloaded scripts or binaries in the user's environment.
Audit Metadata