stacked-prs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from Git history and PR metadata that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflow §1) usesgh pr listto fetch PR titles and metadata;references/provenance.md(§ Verifying Trailers) usesgit logto extract commit messages and trailers. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" prompts when ingesting external data into the stack model.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities including
git push --force-with-lease,gh pr edit(base retargeting), anduv runfor executing arbitrary local and delegated Python scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of PR content or commit messages before they are processed by the skill's logic.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to install a GitHub CLI extension if it is not present in the environment.
- Evidence:
references/github-native.mdcontains the commandgh extension install github/gh-stack. - Note: This operation targets the official GitHub organization, which is recognized as a well-known and trusted service.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes Python scripts dynamically, including scripts from other registered skills.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(§5) describes runningscripts/ship.pyfrom the absolute base directory of theship-workflowskill usinguv run. - Evidence:
SKILL.md(§4) usesuv runto execute local scripts likescripts/validate_evals.py. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on shell commands to manage repository state and interact with providers.
- Evidence: Commands such as
git rev-parse,git status,git merge-tree,gh pr create, andgh apiare central to the skill's operational logic.
Audit Metadata