skills/mathews-tom/armory/tldraw/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tldraw

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to install the @kitschpatrol/tldraw-cli package globally using npm install -g. It also includes steps to download specific versions of the Chrome browser binary using npx puppeteer browsers install chrome@<version> to support headless rendering via Puppeteer.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves multiple shell command executions to verify tool availability, create directories, and perform the export process. This includes commands such as tldraw --version, mkdir -p, tldraw export, and operating system-specific commands like open, xdg-open, or start to display the resulting files to the user.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a vision-based self-check mechanism (Step 5) where an agent-generated image, based on user-provided natural language descriptions, is processed by a vision-enabled model. This creates a potential surface where malicious instructions embedded in the generated diagram text could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the automated review phase.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided natural language descriptions for diagrams (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or instructions.
  • Capability inventory: File system writes (mkdir), command execution (tldraw export), package installation (npm install), and opening files via OS commands (SKILL.md, references/troubleshooting.md).
  • Sanitization: None; the skill translates user text into JSON labels for diagram shapes without filtering.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 24, 2026, 09:35 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tldraw