tldraw
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to install the
@kitschpatrol/tldraw-clipackage globally usingnpm install -g. It also includes steps to download specific versions of the Chrome browser binary usingnpx puppeteer browsers install chrome@<version>to support headless rendering via Puppeteer. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves multiple shell command executions to verify tool availability, create directories, and perform the export process. This includes commands such as
tldraw --version,mkdir -p,tldraw export, and operating system-specific commands likeopen,xdg-open, orstartto display the resulting files to the user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a vision-based self-check mechanism (Step 5) where an agent-generated image, based on user-provided natural language descriptions, is processed by a vision-enabled model. This creates a potential surface where malicious instructions embedded in the generated diagram text could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the automated review phase.
- Ingestion points: User-provided natural language descriptions for diagrams (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system writes (
mkdir), command execution (tldraw export), package installation (npm install), and opening files via OS commands (SKILL.md, references/troubleshooting.md). - Sanitization: None; the skill translates user text into JSON labels for diagram shapes without filtering.
Audit Metadata