mps-mcp-build
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-provided values such as function names, server addresses, and file paths directly into shell-executed commands, including
matlab -batchandcurl. - Evidence: In Step 5, the
<fcnName>,<scheme>,<host>,<port>, and<absolute-folder-path>variables are interpolated into a MATLAB command string passed to the-batchflag. - Evidence: Step 4.5 uses
curlwith interpolated<scheme>,<host>,<port>, and<archiveName>to perform a JSON-RPC ping to the user-specified server. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates MATLAB code at runtime, sometimes writing it to temporary
.mfiles, and then executes it usingmatlab -batch. - Evidence: Step 5 explicitly instructs the agent to create a temporary script for complex builds and run it with
matlab -batch "run('<path>')". - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill modifies the agent's global configuration file to ensure the newly created tools are automatically loaded in future sessions.
- Evidence: Step 7 describes the process for reading and writing to
~/.claude.jsonto add new entries under themcpServerskey. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the agent's sensitive configuration files, which may contain information about other configured tools or environment settings.
- Evidence: Step 7 requires the agent to read the contents of
~/.claude.jsonto register the new MCP server. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external
.mfiles and user-defined resource strings, creating a potential surface for indirect injection attacks. - Ingestion points: User-provided
.mfunction files (Step 2/3), server resources (Step 2), and build manifests (Step 4.1). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings for the agent when processing the content of these external inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution (
matlab,curl,rm,cp,mkdir) and the ability to modify the agent's~/.claude.jsonconfiguration file. - Sanitization: While the skill performs path existence and filename case validation, it lacks explicit sanitization for the content of the functions or resource strings before they are incorporated into the build and deployment process.
Audit Metadata