electron
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external desktop applications.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads UI snapshots and text content from Electron applications (e.g., Slack, VS Code) using the
agent-browser snapshotandagent-browser get textcommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and the data/text found within the automated applications.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
Bashtool, allowing it to execute shell commands, and theagent-browsertool, which allows for complex interaction with the target application (clicking, typing, form filling). - Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or filter the content retrieved from applications before processing it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to launch applications with specific flags and to interact with them via the
agent-browserCLI tool. This capability provides the agent with control over local applications and the host system environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxto executeagent-browser, which may involve fetching the package from the official npm registry. This is documented neutrally as it is a common practice for Node.js-based automation tools.
Audit Metadata