audio-reply

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct and execute shell commands (uv run mlx_audio.tts.generate) using text derived from external URLs or user input. The implementation uses double-quoted string interpolation (--text "Your response text") which is vulnerable to shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, command substitution, or escaping the quotes) if the input text is not perfectly sanitized by the agent.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the web through its "read it to me" feature, creating a potential attack surface where malicious content could override agent instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Content is fetched from arbitrary URLs via the WebFetch tool as described in SKILL.md under the "Read URL Content" section.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or boundary markers for fetched content, relying instead on the agent to "summarize aggressively."
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (uv run, rm) and write/delete files in the /tmp/ directory.
  • Sanitization: The instructions recommend stripping HTML and omitting sensitive values but lack robust technical sanitization (like shell escaping) for the text before it is interpolated into the TTS command.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the mlx_audio package and a 500MB voice model from Hugging Face (mlx-community/chatterbox-turbo-fp16) during its initial run. While these are reputable community sources for the MLX framework, they represent external code and data dependencies executed locally.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 04:23 AM