deps
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits project information including the project slug and the absolute filesystem path (via
pwd) to an external service called "Atrium". The instructions describe usingPOST /api/dev-projects/syncandPOST /api/dev-projects/{slug}/dep-decisionsto sync this data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources that could be controlled by an attacker, such as package manifest files and vulnerability audit reports.
- Ingestion points: Project manifest files (
package.json,pyproject.toml,requirements.txt,Cargo.toml,go.mod) and outputs fromnpm audit,pip audit, andcargo auditinSKILL.md(Step 1-3). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bashfor shell command execution andcurlfor network requests. - Sanitization: While the skill uses
jqto parse structured JSON data, it does not sanitize the values within that data before presenting them to the agent for decision-making. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
Bashto execute multiple package management and auditing tools (npm,pip,uv,cargo,go,pip-audit,cargo-audit,cargo-outdated). These commands are triggered based on the presence of local files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curlto fetch dependency decisions and project history from the Atrium service (GET /{slug}/dep-decisions/overdue,GET /api/dev-projects/{slug}/history). The destination URL resolution logic is not explicitly defined in the provided file.
Audit Metadata