code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from git commit logs, diff outputs, and external specification files. This content is interpolated directly into prompts for sub-agents without explicit isolation.
- Ingestion points: Git diff output, commit messages via
git log, and specification files located indocs/,specs/, or.scratch/. - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not specify using delimiters or XML tags to encapsulate the external data passed to sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
gitand spawning of sub-agent processes. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content filtering is implemented for the ingested text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill accepts a user-provided string for the git 'fixed point' and incorporates it directly into shell commands. This creates a potential command injection vector if the input is not strictly validated as a git reference.
- Evidence: The skill instructions specify executing
git diff <fixed-point>...HEADandgit log <fixed-point>..HEADbased on user input.
Audit Metadata