diagnosing-bugs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill workflow involves processing potentially untrusted data that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Phase 1 & 2) instructs the agent to read and analyze HAR files, log dumps, core dumps, and captured network traces.
- Boundary markers: While the skill mandates redacting secrets (credentials), it does not specify markers or instructions to treat data content as untrusted to prevent indirect prompt injection.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to execute shell scripts, run local test suites, and perform network operations via curl.
- Sanitization: The primary sanitization mentioned is privacy-focused (redacting auth headers and secrets) rather than security-focused (escaping or filtering embedded instructions).
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The debugging process requires the agent to generate and run transient code to reproduce and minimize failures.
- Evidence: SKILL.md outlines the creation of 'throwaway harnesses', 'bisection harnesses', and scripts for Playwright/Puppeteer to exercise code paths.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes various local system commands to execute the feedback loop and diagnostics.
- Evidence: The instructions include the use of
curlfor HTTP requests,git bisectfor regression testing, and the execution of the providedscripts/hitl-loop.template.shbash script.
Audit Metadata