he-worktree
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script located at
scripts/runbooks/select-runbooks.shto determine workflow logic and retrieve additional instructions. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions direct the agent to copy
.envfiles and local configuration overrides to new worktree paths. While this is a common developer workflow for environment setup,.envfiles are sensitive and typically contain credentials, tokens, or private configuration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting the output of an external script and applying it as additional instructions ('runbooks') for the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Output from the execution of
bash scripts/runbooks/select-runbooks.sh --skill he-worktree(Phase 0, step 7). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks technical boundary markers or delimiters for the injected content, though it includes a policy-based instruction that runbooks 'must not waive or override gates codified here'.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute arbitrary git commands, read/write files (including sensitive paths like
.env), and execute local shell scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation, sanitization, or filtering of the content returned by the runbook selection script before it is integrated into the prompt context.
Audit Metadata