he-worktree

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script located at scripts/runbooks/select-runbooks.sh to determine workflow logic and retrieve additional instructions.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions direct the agent to copy .env files and local configuration overrides to new worktree paths. While this is a common developer workflow for environment setup, .env files are sensitive and typically contain credentials, tokens, or private configuration.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting the output of an external script and applying it as additional instructions ('runbooks') for the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Output from the execution of bash scripts/runbooks/select-runbooks.sh --skill he-worktree (Phase 0, step 7).
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks technical boundary markers or delimiters for the injected content, though it includes a policy-based instruction that runbooks 'must not waive or override gates codified here'.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute arbitrary git commands, read/write files (including sensitive paths like .env), and execute local shell scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation, sanitization, or filtering of the content returned by the runbook selection script before it is integrated into the prompt context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 19, 2026, 11:11 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — he-worktree