prd-to-stories
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands using a CLI tool named
bdto create tasks and epics. - Evidence: In Step 9, the skill uses
bd createwith arguments such as--descriptionand--acceptancewhich are populated with content parsed from the PRD file. If the PRD contains shell metacharacters or maliciously crafted strings, it could lead to unintended command execution depending on the agent's shell handling. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the filesystem.
- Ingestion points:
docs/prd.mdand existing files indocs/stories/are read into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the PRD content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the
docs/stories/directory and execute shell commands via thebdtool. - Sanitization: While the skill includes a strong sanitization step for filenames (stripping
/,\, and..), it does not explicitly instruct the agent to sanitize or escape the content used in thebdcommand arguments or the content written to the story files. - [SAFE]: The skill demonstrates positive security awareness by explicitly instructing the agent to avoid sensitive files.
- Evidence: Step 1 contains a clear directive: "Do NOT read or surface the contents of secrets files (
.env,*.key,credentials.*,secrets/). Do not reproduce literal hostnames, connection strings, or API keys in story files."
Audit Metadata