skills/maxbarbul/skills/get-web-page/Gen Agent Trust Hub

get-web-page

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to interpolate a user-provided {URL} directly into a shell command (npx -y url-to-markdown-cli-tool {URL}). This is highly susceptible to command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters (e.g., ; rm -rf /), allowing for arbitrary code execution on the host machine.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes npx -y to download and execute an external, unverified package (url-to-markdown-cli-tool) from the public npm registry at runtime. This poses a supply chain risk as the package content is not pinned to a specific version or hash, and its source is not a trusted vendor.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and executes remote code from the npm registry every time the skill is invoked, which can be exploited if the package is hijacked or replaced with a malicious version.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted web content fetched via the conversion tool (SKILL.md, Workflow 1).
  • Boundary markers: None present; the skill treats the tool's output as the source of truth without wrapping it in delimiters or providing instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has shell execution capabilities (npx) and file-writing capabilities (> page.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the fetched Markdown content is performed before it is presented to the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 6, 2026, 10:58 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — get-web-page