rust-warn-fix
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to dynamically construct and execute shell commands using the
$ARGUMENTSvariable (e.g.,cargo clippy -p <package>). Because there are no instructions to sanitize or validate this user-provided input, it is vulnerable to command injection if a user provides input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it parses output from external tools (
cargo clippy) and uses that data to drive its 'Decision Framework' for editing files. - Ingestion points: Output from
cargo clippyexecution in SKILL.md (Step 1 and Step 3). - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is instructed to 'categorize each remaining warning' directly from the tool's stdout/stderr.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use
Bash,Read, andEdittools, allowing it to modify source code based on what it perceives in the warning messages. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no validation of the warning content to ensure it does not contain malicious instructions or misleading filenames designed to trick the agent into performing unauthorized edits.
Audit Metadata