skills/maxgfr/skills/verify/Gen Agent Trust Hub

verify

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically extracts and executes commands from repository configuration files, such as package.json, Makefile, justfile, and GitHub Actions workflows (.github/workflows/*.yml). The detection logic in scripts/detect-gates.mjs uses keyword-based filters (CI_SIGNAL and CI_NOISE) which could potentially be bypassed by malicious repositories embedding arbitrary commands within seemingly benign script blocks.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from project plans, issue descriptions, and repository diffs to generate verification matrices and behavior proof procedures. There is a risk that malicious instructions embedded in these sources could influence the commands executed during the 'Behavior Proof' lane (Lane D) or the 'Fix' loop (Phase 5).
  • Ingestion points: Plan text from ~/.claude/plans/, project files, and git diffs.
  • Boundary markers: Prompts use structured sections but lack explicit instructions to disregard embedded commands in the source text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via sub-agents and write to the file system during the fix phase.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of input text before it is used to formulate proof procedures.
  • [SAFE]: The skill includes a deterministic guard (scripts/forbidden-repairs.mjs) specifically designed to prevent the AI from 'cheating' during the fix loop by adding suppressions (e.g., @ts-ignore), skipping tests, or tampering with CI configurations. This is an excellent safety practice that preserves the integrity of the verification process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 15, 2026, 06:28 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — verify