team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable, which is directly interpolated into the task description. This description is used to guide agent selection and is passed to subagents as their core mission. Without delimiters or sanitization, a malicious task could influence or override the instructions of the coordinator or the subagents.\n - Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder inSKILL.mdreceives raw user input.\n - Boundary markers: There are no protective delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or "ignore" instructions surrounding the user input.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Tasktool to spawn subagents, reads agent definitions from.claude/agents/, and writes output to thedocs/directory.\n - Sanitization: No validation or filtering is applied to the task description before it is processed.
Audit Metadata