2d-pixel-asset
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
process_asset.pyscript employs thetrust_remote_code=Trueparameter when loading theBiRefNetmodel from Hugging Face. This setting allows the repository to execute arbitrary Python code on the local machine during the model loading process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's workflow instructs the agent to run shell commands that incorporate variables like
{target_size}(from user input) and{downloaded_file}(from the file system). This creates a command injection surface if the agent executes these strings without proper sanitization or escaping. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a large ML model (~1GB) from Hugging Face when the
--mlflag is used for background removal. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data (user arguments and external filenames) to perform sensitive operations.
- Ingestion points: User-provided CLI arguments (
--size) and the names of files found in the~/Downloadsfolder. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or security warnings are used when interpolating these values into shell commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the shell to list files, move files, create directories, and run Python scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping logic in the provided Python script or the workflow instructions.
Audit Metadata