Impress

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data and files which may contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The generate_from_template function in SKILL.md ingests content via the template_path and content dictionary.
  • Boundary markers: The implementation lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the processed files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes functions that call subprocess.run to execute system utilities like zip, unzip, and soffice (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before the data is interpolated into the presentation's content.xml file.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing system-level commands through Python's subprocess.run module to handle presentation file manipulation (zipping/unzipping) and conversion via the soffice binary. While the use of argument lists mitigates shell injection, this remains a significant capability that interacts directly with the host environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 01:26 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — Impress