sales-account-segmentation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions describe a workflow that is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the ingestion of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md, the instructions explicitly direct the agent to "read CRM exports or the company's website" to pre-fill interview answers and draft candidate models. It also involves processing "product-usage data" and "web analytics." - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or provide the agent with "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the external data it is expected to process.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates a structured "model charter" as text output and utilizes the platform's "persistent memory" to store decisions. It does not perform arbitrary command execution or network exfiltration.
- Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating the content retrieved from CRM exports or websites before it is incorporated into the agent's reasoning process.
Audit Metadata