multi-branch-cluster-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs high-impact cleanup operations that affect the entire local Minikube environment rather than just the skill-specific clusters.
- Evidence: The script
setup-clusters.shexecutesminikube delete --all, which destroys all existing Minikube profiles on the user's system. - Evidence: Multiple scripts use
pkill -fto terminate processes likekubectl port-forwardanddevspace devglobally by name. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-provided strings are interpolated directly into shell commands, presenting a command injection surface.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to rungit worktree add /tmp/ark-worktree-<branchN-slug> <BRANCHN>, where<BRANCHN>is taken directly from the user's request. - Evidence: The instruction to run
bash .claude/skills/multi-branch-cluster-setup/scripts/setup-clusters.sh <branch1> <branch2> ...passes raw user input as shell arguments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly command the agent to bypass human-in-the-loop safety checks for high-risk operations.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains the instruction: "If the user's message contains branch names... extract all of them directly — do NOT ask for confirmation."
Audit Metadata