openspec-bulk-archive-change
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using variables derived from the local environment without explicit sanitization or escaping.
- Evidence: In Step 8, the skill uses the
<name>variable (fromopenspec list) directly in a shell command:mv openspec/changes/<name> openspec/changes/archive/YYYY-MM-DD-<name>. - Potential Impact: If a directory name or change title contains shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, backticks, or command substitutions), it could lead to unauthorized command execution when the archive step is performed.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and processes external files to make decisions about conflict resolution, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Files located at
openspec/changes/<name>/tasks.mdand theopenspec/changes/<name>/specs/directory, as well as JSON output from theopenspec listcommand. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
mkdir,mv), search the entire codebase, and perform complex logic to resolve capability conflicts. - Sanitization: Absent; the data read from the filesystem is used to drive the agent's "agentic resolution" logic in Step 5 without filtering or validation, allowing malicious instructions in a
tasks.mdor delta spec to potentially influence the agent's actions.
Audit Metadata