slack-announcement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during summarization.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from GitHub release bodies (
gh release view), pull request metadata and file lists (gh pr view), and GitHub Project iteration items (gh api graphql). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in the ingested GitHub data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
ghCLI for repository interaction,curlfor network requests to documentation sites, and clipboard tools (pbcopy,xclip,clip.exe) for final output delivery. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content pulled from GitHub before the agent processes and summarizes it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the agent with specific shell commands to execute locally.
- Evidence: Instructions include the use of
ghCLI commands to list and view releases, pull requests, and project board data. It also usescurlto verify documentation link status and system clipboard utilities (pbcopy,xclip,clip.exe) to deliver the final post. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data and verify resources from external domains.
- Evidence: The skill uses
ghto fetch release and PR data fromgithub.comandcurlto check the availability of documentation pages hosted onmckinsey.github.io(GitHub Pages). These are vendor-owned resources but represent external network activity.
Audit Metadata