wechat-local-vault

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script extract_keys.py uses subprocess.run to execute system commands including codesign (to re-sign the WeChat binary), pgrep (to find running processes), and pip (to install packages). It also generates a temporary Python script at runtime and executes it as a child process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The extract_keys.py script contains logic to automatically download and install third-party libraries (frida, frida-tools, pycryptodome) from the Python Package Index (PyPI) if they are missing from the environment.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation and execution. Specifically, extract_keys.py assembles a Frida instrumentation script and a Python host wrapper from templates, writes them to a temporary file, and executes them to hook into the WeChat process memory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from WeChat chat history and social feeds.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from local SQLite databases via vault_cli.py, export_chat.py, and search_sns.py.
  • Boundary markers: The SKILL.md instructions recommend summarizing content and writing full exports to files to limit the amount of raw, untrusted text in the LLM context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses, perform ad-hoc code signing, and read/write to the filesystem.
  • Sanitization: Content is partially normalized and decoded (e.g., Zstd decompression) before processing, but lacks robust sanitization of potentially malicious instructions embedded in chat messages.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 03:17 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — wechat-local-vault