wechat-local-vault
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
extract_keys.pyusessubprocess.runto execute system commands includingcodesign(to re-sign the WeChat binary),pgrep(to find running processes), andpip(to install packages). It also generates a temporary Python script at runtime and executes it as a child process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
extract_keys.pyscript contains logic to automatically download and install third-party libraries (frida,frida-tools,pycryptodome) from the Python Package Index (PyPI) if they are missing from the environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation and execution. Specifically,
extract_keys.pyassembles a Frida instrumentation script and a Python host wrapper from templates, writes them to a temporary file, and executes them to hook into the WeChat process memory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from WeChat chat history and social feeds.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from local SQLite databases via
vault_cli.py,export_chat.py, andsearch_sns.py. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdinstructions recommend summarizing content and writing full exports to files to limit the amount of raw, untrusted text in the LLM context. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses, perform ad-hoc code signing, and read/write to the filesystem.
- Sanitization: Content is partially normalized and decoded (e.g., Zstd decompression) before processing, but lacks robust sanitization of potentially malicious instructions embedded in chat messages.
Audit Metadata