yichen-volc-asr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uploads user-provided media files to Volcengine TOS (TOS_BUCKET) and explicitly modifies the Access Control List (ACL) to allow public read access for all users.
- Evidence: In
scripts/transcribe.py, theset_public_accessfunction sends an ACL XML configuration to the cloud storage endpoint that grantsREADpermission to theAllUsersgroup. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script performs automated video editing by executing
ffmpegas a subprocess. - Evidence:
scripts/transcribe.pydynamically constructs a list of arguments forffmpegand executes it viasubprocess.run(cmd, ...)to render the final edited video. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcription data (ASR results) which is then used by the agent to make logic-based decisions about video editing (e.g., determining which segments to KEEP or DELETE).
- Ingestion points: Audio and video content is transcribed into text via
scripts/transcribe.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the processing logic to distinguish between data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: Local file system access, network upload to Volcengine, and
ffmpegcommand execution. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the transcribed text before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
Audit Metadata