yichen-volc-asr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uploads user-provided media files to Volcengine TOS (TOS_BUCKET) and explicitly modifies the Access Control List (ACL) to allow public read access for all users.
  • Evidence: In scripts/transcribe.py, the set_public_access function sends an ACL XML configuration to the cloud storage endpoint that grants READ permission to the AllUsers group.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script performs automated video editing by executing ffmpeg as a subprocess.
  • Evidence: scripts/transcribe.py dynamically constructs a list of arguments for ffmpeg and executes it via subprocess.run(cmd, ...) to render the final edited video.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcription data (ASR results) which is then used by the agent to make logic-based decisions about video editing (e.g., determining which segments to KEEP or DELETE).
  • Ingestion points: Audio and video content is transcribed into text via scripts/transcribe.py.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the processing logic to distinguish between data and instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Local file system access, network upload to Volcengine, and ffmpeg command execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the transcribed text before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 11, 2026, 09:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — yichen-volc-asr