yichen-wechat-local-vault
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic script generation and execution in
scripts/extract_keys.py. It constructs a Python host script and a JavaScript instrumentation script from internal templates, writes the host script to a temporary file, and executes it to facilitate process hooking and key extraction. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes WeChat chat logs, which contain untrusted data from third parties. If an agent analyzes these logs, there is a risk that malicious messages could act as indirect prompt injections to override the agent's instructions.
- Ingestion points: Chat data is read from decrypted SQLite databases by
scripts/vault_cli.py,scripts/export_chat.py, andscripts/wechat_digest.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use specific delimiters to isolate user-generated chat content from the rest of the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution (
codesign,pip,pgrep), process instrumentation via Frida, and local file system writes. - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or escaping is applied to the chat message content before it is presented to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
scripts/extract_keys.pyusessubprocess.runto execute system commands, includingcodesignfor ad-hoc signing of application binaries andpgrepfor process discovery. These are used to bypass system library validation and attach debuggers to the local WeChat process. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
pipto automatically install thefrida,frida-tools, andpycryptodomepackages from the Python Package Index (PyPI) if they are missing at runtime.
Audit Metadata