lcs-explore
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill captures user responses during multi-round interviews and synthesizes this data into a markdown artifact (
explore.md). This process introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions provided by a user could be stored and later executed or interpreted by other agents or tools that process the generated PRD or project state. - Ingestion points: User chat responses collected during the interactive interview rounds defined in the workflow (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill instructions reference an external contract (
../lcs-shared/contract.md) for artifact writing safety, although the specific delimiting techniques or guardrails are not implemented within the provided file content. - Capability inventory: The skill performs filesystem write operations to create artifacts in the
.lcs/work-items/directory and updates the.lcs/state.mdfile. - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly require the agent to "interpret faithfully" and "accept" custom answers without forcing them into predefined options, which indicates that user-provided text is passed through to the artifacts without rigorous filtering or sanitization.
Audit Metadata