lcs-toprd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes content from various external sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in project files could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions direct the agent to read data from
state.md,explore.md,debug.md,prd-enhanced.md, theresearch/directory, andwayfinder-map.md. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing to the filesystem (
prd.md) and updating state configuration files (.lcs/state.md). - Boundary markers: The prompt templates and behavior instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the content read from these external files.
- Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or validate the content extracted from the source files before it is processed or written back to the PRD.
Audit Metadata