automate-me
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mines conversation transcripts to identify user working patterns, which introduces an attack surface where malicious instructions from past sessions could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Conversation transcripts located in the active workspace's store, fanned out to subagents for analysis (Step 1).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or explicit warnings for the subagents to ignore instructions embedded within the processed transcript data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write files to the local file system (Step 4), execute git commands (Step 0, Step 6), and spawn further subagents (Step 1).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the mined transcript content before it is incorporated into the draft of a new agent skill.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to manage its lifecycle, including using
git logto determine last-edit timestamps (Step 0) and performing git worktree, commit, and pull request operations to deploy the resulting skills (Step 6). - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill attempts to modify the user's agent configuration by offering to add skill overrides to the
~/.claude/settings.jsonfile (Step 4). This modification changes the agent's environment and how it loads skills across different sessions.
Audit Metadata