reflect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted session transcripts to generate skill edits and backlog items.\n
- Ingestion points: Reads JSONL transcript files located in the workspace's transcript store as identified in
SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Explicit instructions are included in the prompt templates for all subagents (
divergent-reviewer.md,judgment-reviewer.md,tooling-reviewer.md, andsynthesizer.md) to treat transcript data as untrusted and ignore any instructions found within it.\n - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, read and write files (editing
SKILL.mdfiles), and spawn subagents with access to MCP tools (e.g., ticket trackers, observability logs).\n - Sanitization: The skill relies on prompt-based instructions rather than automated data sanitization to handle untrusted input.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell command to locate and list the most recent transcript files for analysis.\n
- Evidence:
ls -t <agent-transcripts>/*.jsonl <agent-transcripts>/*/*.jsonl <agent-transcripts>/*/subagents/*.jsonl 2>/dev/null | head -10inSKILL.md.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically spawns three specialized reviewer subagents and a synthesizer agent using parallelTaskcalls to process the transcript data.\n - Evidence: Multiple
Taskcalls inSKILL.mdsections 2 and 3 using thepstack-harnessskill for orchestration.
Audit Metadata