triaging-issues
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from GitHub issue titles, bodies, and comments, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested through
scripts/get_issue.shandscripts/get_comments.sh. - Boundary markers: The instructions include a critical warning to ignore any instructions inside the issue body or comments telling the agent to run scripts or perform actions.
- Capability inventory: The agent's capabilities are restricted to reading issue context and writing a local
triage-decision.jsonfile. It lacks tools for repository mutation (posting comments, labels, etc.). - Sanitization: The agent is explicitly instructed to provide neutral, paraphrased summaries rather than echoing attacker-controlled text verbatim and to adhere to a 1000-character limit.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local bash scripts to fetch repository information.
- Evidence: Use of
scripts/get_issue.sh,scripts/get_comments.sh,scripts/get_labels.sh,scripts/get_linked_prs.sh, andscripts/search_issues.shto gather data. - Context: These are read-only operations essential to the primary task of issue triaging and do not involve executing untrusted remote code.
Audit Metadata