agentic-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup instructions direct the installation of the
@mhrj/mcp-agent-looppackage from the NPM registry using thenpxcommand. This package is an external dependency provided by the skill's author (meharajM). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill design creates an indirect prompt injection surface by storing and recalling untrusted data within the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the agent's memory via the
init_looptool (objective parameter), theresume_looptool (human feedback), and through the results of actions logged vialog_stepwhich are subsequently read from theloop://resource. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters, XML tags, or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when the agent reads from its persistent state file.
- Capability inventory: The skill is intended for use in environments where the agent has significant capabilities, including running bash commands and editing files, which increases the risk of successful exploitation if malicious instructions are injected into the memory state.
- Sanitization: No mechanism for sanitizing or validating the content stored in the persistent memory is described in the skill's instructions.
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