designer-handoff
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a global NPM package
ui-ux-pro-max-cliand downloads thenutlope/hallmarkskill from a GitHub repository. These sources do not match established trusted vendor patterns. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically runs shell commands to verify environmental prerequisites (
npm list,which) and invokes an external CLI tool for initialization (uipro init) and artifact generation (uipro generate). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted user input and incorporating it into a 'design spec' that serves as a mandatory contract for other agents.
- Ingestion points: User-provided project type, stack, and brand mood, as well as data from auxiliary skills like
spec-driven-developmentandbrainstormingreferenced in sections 2 and 3. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions within the
spec.mdfile to prevent a downstream agent from obeying malicious instructions embedded in the input requirements. - Capability inventory: The targeted frontend agent (omo
visual-engineeringcategory) has the capability to write and modify UI code based on these instructions. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation is present for user-provided variables before they are used in shell command arguments or output to the generated specification.
Audit Metadata