image-edit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly requests permission to read sensitive configuration and credential files at
~/.meitu/credentials.jsonand~/.meitu/tool-registry.json. While these appear to be vendor-specific files for the Meitu service, accessing local credential stores is a sensitive operation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions suggest downloading and installing the
meitu-clipackage from the official NPM registry (npm install -g meitu-cli@latest) if the dependency is missing or outdated. NPM is a well-known service, and the package is a vendor-owned resource. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality relies on executing the
meitucommand-line tool with various arguments, including file paths and user-provided strings. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a shell command template that interpolates the user-provided
promptdirectly into the--promptargument:meitu image-edit ... --prompt "<edit_description>". This pattern creates a command injection surface if the user-supplied text contains shell metacharacters (like backticks or subshell syntax) that are not properly sanitized or escaped before execution. - Ingestion points: The
promptandimage_listparameters are derived from user input and external data. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
execpermissions for themeituCLI andfile_writepermissions to save results. - Boundary markers: The prompt is wrapped in double quotes in the command template, which provides minimal protection against sophisticated shell injection.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation, escaping, or sanitization requirements for the user-provided prompt before it is passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata