advise

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests GitHub metadata (descriptions, issue/PR bodies, webhook URLs) from potentially untrusted sources.
  • Ingestion points: GitHub repository metadata and content fetched via gh tools.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions include a 'Standing security posture' section explicitly defining ingested content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: Includes GitHub CLI execution (gh) and browser automation capabilities.
  • Sanitization: Instructions mandate that the agent surface suspicious embedded content to the user rather than executing it.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the gh CLI for administrative tasks. It defines a strict 'Read-only contract' for bare invocations, ensuring no mutations (create, edit, delete, or GraphQL mutations) occur without the user explicitly providing the --apply flag and following a defined confirmation flow.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches official GitHub documentation at runtime to ground its recommendations. These downloads target official, well-known GitHub domains for their intended primary purpose.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads organization-level state (members, billing, rulesets) through the user's authenticated session. This data is used exclusively to anchor design advice to the user's specific environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 07:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — advise