draft-goal-condition

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from Anthropic's official documentation at https://code.claude.com/docs/en/goal to extract current character limits and formatting rules. This is a well-known service and the fetch is used for configuration purposes.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script goal-condition-length.sh located within the plugin root. It uses a robust method for passing user-controlled content by writing it to a temporary file (--file <path-to-draft>) instead of direct shell interpolation, which prevents common shell injection attacks from the goal text itself.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it parses external, untrusted content (the documentation website) to determine the value for the --limit argument passed to the shell script. If the documentation source were compromised or malformed, the extracted value could potentially be used to inject shell metacharacters into the command line.
  • Ingestion points: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/goal (Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: None; the skill relies on the AI to accurately extract a number from the page text.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of a local Bash script via bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/goal-condition-length.sh" (Step 3).
  • Sanitization: The skill explicitly recommends using the --file flag to sanitize the drafted condition content, but it lacks specific validation or sanitization instructions for the --limit value extracted from the web.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 07:55 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — draft-goal-condition