draft-goal-condition
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from Anthropic's official documentation at
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/goalto extract current character limits and formatting rules. This is a well-known service and the fetch is used for configuration purposes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script
goal-condition-length.shlocated within the plugin root. It uses a robust method for passing user-controlled content by writing it to a temporary file (--file <path-to-draft>) instead of direct shell interpolation, which prevents common shell injection attacks from the goal text itself. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it parses external, untrusted content (the documentation website) to determine the value for the
--limitargument passed to the shell script. If the documentation source were compromised or malformed, the extracted value could potentially be used to inject shell metacharacters into the command line. - Ingestion points:
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/goal(Step 1). - Boundary markers: None; the skill relies on the AI to accurately extract a number from the page text.
- Capability inventory: Execution of a local Bash script via
bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/goal-condition-length.sh"(Step 3). - Sanitization: The skill explicitly recommends using the
--fileflag to sanitize the drafted condition content, but it lacks specific validation or sanitization instructions for the--limitvalue extracted from the web.
Audit Metadata