known-issues
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes system tools such as
gh,npm,grep, andpythonto manage its issue registry. It implements high-quality security hygiene by using single-quoted heredocs (e.g.,cat <<'ISSUE_BODY') incontext/action-create.mdto ensure that user-provided content in issue bodies cannot be executed as shell commands. Additionally, theregistry_dirconfiguration includes strict validation against path traversal, rejecting absolute paths, parent directory segments (..), and symlinks that resolve outside the project directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from trusted and well-known services, specifically GitHub (
github.com) and Anthropic's official status page (status.claude.com), as well as Marginlab (marginlab.ai). These operations are essential for tracking product bugs and service health and align with the skill's primary purpose. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its core function involves reading and displaying untrusted data from external sources (GitHub issue titles, descriptions, and community-reported status updates).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
gh issue view,gh search, and web requests to external status pages. - Boundary markers: Output templates in
context/output-templates.mdlack explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands in the external data. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, write to the local file system (registry management), and create new GitHub issues.
- Sanitization: Mitigation is present in the form of schema validation in
scripts/registry_manager.pyand safe shell quoting in the provided bash scripts.
Audit Metadata