cloudflare
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to install the
cfpackage from npm (npm i -g cf), falsely claiming it is the "official Cloudflare CLI". The actual official CLI for Cloudflare iswrangler. Thecfpackage on npm is associated with Cloud Foundry, not Cloudflare, creating a supply chain risk through misdirection. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions require the user to perform OAuth authentication via
cf auth loginand to exportCLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID. Providing these credentials to an incorrect and unverified tool exposes the user's Cloudflare environment to compromise. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill relies on executing shell commands using a tool that is not the official provider CLI, including commands for sensitive operations like modifying DNS, deploying Workers, and accessing R2 storage.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest DNS record data from various third-party services (e.g., Stripe, Google, Lumail) and apply them to the Cloudflare environment.
- Ingestion points: DNS record details provided by external services mentioned in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers are provided when interpolating external record data into the
cf dns records createcommand. - Capability inventory: Full CLI access for DNS management, Worker deployment (
cf deploy), R2 storage manipulation (cf r2 objects put), and WAF/SSL configuration. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any instruction to validate or sanitize the record content (type, name, content, priority) before execution, allowing for potential command injection or malicious record insertion if the external data is poisoned.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata