codex-images
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/image_genscript executes thecodexcommand-line utility vianode:child_process.spawn. It specifically uses the--sandbox danger-full-accessflag, which grants the utility extensive permissions during execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation recommends the global installation of the
@openai/codexpackage via NPM. This is an official utility provided by OpenAI, a well-known service provider. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes image generation prompts provided via the command line or from files. These strings are interpolated into a system-style prompt for the nested Codex agent (in
scripts/image_gen) without using sanitization or boundary markers. This creates a surface where malicious prompt data could attempt to override the instructions of the nested agent. - Ingestion points: Prompts provided via
--promptsor--promptarguments inscripts/image_gen. - Boundary markers: Absent; the prompt text is appended directly to the end of the instruction block.
- Capability inventory: The script can execute the Codex CLI with full sandbox access and perform file system operations (read/write/copy) within the repository and the
~/.codexdirectory. - Sanitization: None; inputs are used verbatim.
Audit Metadata